I study bankruptcy problems under the assumption that claimants have referencedependent preferences. I consider different specifications for claimants' reference points and show how perceived gains and losses impact on aggregate welfare. I can thus rank the four most prominent rules (Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, and Talmud) on the basis of the level of utilitarian and maxmin welfare that they generate. When none of these rules maximizes welfare, I identify the rule that does it and discuss its properties.
Introduction
In a bankruptcy problem, an arbitrator must allocate a finite and perfectly divisible resource among several claimants whose claims sum up to a greater amount than what is available. Situations that match this description include the liquidation of a bankrupted firm among its creditors, the division of an estate among heirs, or the allocation of time to the completion of projects assigned by different clients.
The formal analysis of bankruptcy problems started with O'Neill (1982) and has flourished since that time (see Moulin, 2002 and Thomson, 2003 , 2015 for detailed surveys).
The research question that underlies the literature is as follows: how shall the arbitrator adjudicate conflicting claims? The answer usually takes the form of an allocation rule, i.e., a procedure that processes the data of the problem (namely, the endowment of the resource and the list of individual claims) and then prescribes an allocation for the arbitrator to implement. The analysis is pursued under the assumption that claimants have monotonically increasing preferences. However, the specific functional form of these preferences is usually left unspecified. As Thomson puts it (2015, p. 57): "In the base model, preferences are not explicitly indicated, but it is implicit that each claimant prefers more of the dividend to less".
In this paper, I study bankruptcy problems when claimants' preferences have an explicit formulation. More precisely, I consider the case of reference-dependent preferences (RDPs), as introduced by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) . Building upon the main insights of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , RDPs acknowledge the fact that an agent's perception of a given outcome is determined not only by the outcome per se but also by how this outcome compares with a certain reference point. In other words, the agent's utility is influenced by perceived gains and losses. RDPs thus seem particularly appropriate for use in capturing the preferences of claimants in bankruptcy problems.
These are, in fact, typical situations in which agents form expectations about what they will get and then inevitably compare the actual outcome with the expected one.
The idea that reference points might play a role in bankruptcy problems is not new.
Chun and Thomson (1992) studied a bargaining problem with claims and interpret the disagreement point as a reference point from which agents measure their gains when evaluating a proposal. Herrero (1998) adopts a similar framework but endogenizes the reference point as a function of the agents' claims and the set of feasible allocations. Pulido et al. (2002 Pulido et al. ( , 2008 ) study bankruptcy problems with reference points in the context of university budgeting procedures. Finally, Hougaard et al. (2012 Hougaard et al. ( , 2013a Hougaard et al. ( , 2013b ) consider a more general model of rationing in which agents have claims as well as baselines, which can also be interpreted as reference points. All these papers, however, analyze the role of reference points in a context in which claimants have standard preferences.
I instead embed the analysis of reference points into the framework of RDPs and focus on the welfare implications that such a setting generates. I consider different specifications for claimants' reference points. This reflects the role that expectations have in determining reference points (Abeler et al., 2011; Ericson and Fuster, 2011 ) and the fact that in a bankruptcy problem there are multiple allocations that can catalyze claimants' expectations. I thus let the vector that collects agents' reference points to coincide with the claims vector, the zero awards vector, the minimal rights vector, and with their beliefs about the awards vector that the arbitrator will implement.
The actual feasibility of these reference points paired with some specific features of RDPs impact on how different rules perform in terms of (utilitarian and maxmin) welfare.
For instance, claimants' diminishing marginal sensitivity to losses implies that, whenever reference points are not feasible, the rules that achieve higher welfare are those that most asymmetrically allocate perceived losses across claimants. In the opposite scenario, diminishing marginal sensitivity to gains implies that, when agents' reference points are mutually feasible, the best rules are those that implement the most equal distributions of perceived gains.
I can thus rank the four most common rules (Proportional, Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses, and Talmud) for any specification of agents' reference points.
The Constrained Equal Awards rule often outperforms other rules. It may, however, fail to select the first-best allocation. When this is the case, I define the rule that maximizes welfare and discuss its properties. For instance, I fully characterize the Small Claims First (SCF) rule, which is the rule that maximizes utilitarian welfare when claimants use their claims as reference points. The Minimal Utility Gap (MUG) rule instead maximizes maxmin welfare when reference points are given by agents' claims or by their minimal rights. And the Constrained Equal Gains (CEG) rule is optimal when agents use as reference points their minimal rights and the arbitrator cares about maxmin welfare. In the course of the analysis, I also discuss the issue of duality and the possibility that claimants have heterogeneous gain-loss functions.
More generally, the analysis highlights the existence of a trade-off between the goal of welfare maximization and the equity of the resulting award vector. This is most evident when claimants use their claims as reference points, as in this case at least some of the agents must necessarily receive less than what they were expecting. The optimal rule (the SCF rule) then prescribes the arbitrator to satisfy as many claimants as possible (i.e., to allocate them what they claim) while simultaneously disappointing at the most those who can be disappointed the most. I show that the SCF rule fails Equal Treatment of Equals, although it satisfies a weaker notion of equity, as embedded in a property that I label Ex-Ante Equal Treatment of Equals. The tension between welfare maximization and equity gets further exacerbated if one is willing to give up the property of Boundedness, which forbids an arbitrator to allocate to any claimant more than his claim. The fact that, because of RDPs, losses loom larger than gains implies that in some circumstances this is exactly what the arbitrator should do. This would, however, lead to an even more skewed distribution of the endowment. In particular, it may hinder some of the claimants from obtaining their minimal rights. The resulting allocation would then be perceived as extremely unfair by some of the agents.
The Model

A Bankruptcy Problem
Let E ∈ R + denote the endowment of the resource to be allocated and N = {1, ..., n} be the set of claimants. Each claimant i ∈ N has a claim c i ∈ R + on E. The vector c = (c 1 , ..., c n ) with ∑ i c i = C collects individual claims. A bankruptcy problem (or claims problem) is a pair (c, E) ∈ R N + × R + where c is such that C ≥ E. I denote with B N the class of all such problems. Note that by defining as L = C − E the aggregate loss, the problem (c, L) is the dual of the problem (c, E). In other words, one can interpret a bankruptcy problem as a problem of allocating what is available (i.e., shares of E), or as a problem of allocating what is missing (i.e., shares of L). 1 A rule R is a function that associates to any problem (c, E) ∈ B N a unique awards vector R (c, E) = (R 1 (c, E) , ..., R n (c, E)). The awards vector R(c, E) must satisfy the following two conditions:
The literature has characterized a large number of rules that respond to different ethical or procedural criteria (see Thomson, 2015 -The Proportional (P) rule, which allocates the endowment proportional to claims:
-The Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) rule, which assigns equal awards to all claimants subject to the requirement that no one receives more than his claim:
The Constrained Equal Losses (CEL) rule, which assigns an equal amount of losses to all claimants subject to the requirement that no one receives a negative amount:
The (c, L) formulation is particularly appropriate when the problem consists in allocating tax burdens, as the vector c can be thought as collecting agents' gross incomes and L is the tax to be levied (Young, 1988 ; Chambers and Moreno-Ternero, 2017), or in deciding how to finance a public good, as c can describe agents' benefits from the usage of the good and L is the cost to be shared (Moulin, 1987 ).
-The Talmud (T) rule, as introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1985) , which foresees two different solutions depending upon the relationship between the half-sum of the claims and the endowment:
Example 1 shows how the four rules works in practice. The example also illustrates some duality results. Two rules R and
the Proportional rule and the Talmud rule are self-dual, whereas the Constrained Equal
Awards rule and the Constrained Equal Losses rule are dual of each other. 
Claimants' Preferences and Social Welfare
I deviate from the baseline model of a bankruptcy problem by assuming that claimants have reference-dependent preferences. I adopt the specification originally proposed by Kőszegi and Rabin (2006) (see Shalev, 2000 , for an alternative approach) and thus endow claimants with the following utility function:
where, as before, R i (c, E) is the amount that agent i receives from the arbitrator when the latter uses rule R and r i ∈ [0, c i ] is the agent's reference point, whose nature I will shortly discuss. The utility that the agent enjoys from the possession/consumption of R i (c, E) is thus linear, as it is usually assumed in the baseline model. 2 However, the agent's overall utility is now also influenced by the function µ(·) which captures the additional effects of perceived gains and losses with respect to the reference point. In line with the original formulation of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) , the function µ(·) is assumed to be continuous, strictly increasing and such that µ(0) = 0. It is is strictly convex in the domain of losses (µ (z) > 0 for any z < 0) and strictly concave in the domain of gains (µ (z) > 0 for any z < 0). Finally, losses loom larger than gains: |µ(−z)| > µ(z) for any z > 0. 3 As measures of welfare, I rely on the two most common notions (see Moulin, 2003 , and Gravel and Moyes, 2013): utilitarian welfare and maxmin welfare. Utilitarian welfare amounts to the sum of individual utilities. Rule R thus generates utilitarian welfare:
where the condition ∑ i R i (c, E) = E holds because of Balance. Maxmin (or Rawlsian) welfare is instead defined by the well-being of the worst-off individual. Rule R thus achieves maxmin welfare:
Both measures of welfare thus explicitly take into account the "behavioral" part of 
Reference Points
Claimants' utility function is given by equation (1) . Here I discuss the nature of agents' reference points r = (r 1 , ..., r n ). I consider different specifications for r. In Section 3.1, I study the case in which agents' reference points coincide with their claims, r = c. In Sec- each agent receives at least r i when reference points are feasible. 4 
Claims as Reference Points
Let agents' reference points be determined by their claims. Formally, let r = c. Claims are thus interpreted as an expression of the agents' rights, needs, demands, or aspirations (Mariotti and Villar, 2005) . The fact that agents use their claims as reference points has already been explored in cooperative models of bargaining (Gupta and Livne, 1988; Thomson, 1994 ) and can be rationalized in different ways. For instance, agents may not be fully aware that they are involved in a bankruptcy problem and that thus rationing must necessarily take place. Alternatively, they may know that the endowment is not enough to satisfy aggregate demand, yet they may think, perhaps erroneously, that they have or deserve some sort of priority with respect to others.
UTILITARIAN WELFARE ANALYSIS
Proposition 1 ranks the Proportional rule, the Constrained Equal Awards rule, and the Constrained Equal Losses rule on the basis of the level of utilitarian welfare that they generate. The ranking holds because the rules differ on how they allocate the aggregate loss across claimants. Since agents display diminishing marginal sensitivity to losses, differences in the allocation of individual losses lead to differences in welfare. 4 The baselines first operator proposed by Hougaard et al. (2012 Hougaard et al. ( , 2013a Hougaard et al. ( , 2013b ) also satisfies this property. A baseline b is an exogenously given or endogenously generated vector that serves as reference point. An operator is a mapping that associates with each rule another one. The baseline first operator maps rule R into rule R where R tackles the problem (c, E) in two stages. If b is feasible, R first allocates b i to each claimant and then allocates what remains of E according to R and the vector of adjusted claims c = c − b. Thus, b is a lower bound for R (c, E). If b is unfeasible, R first adjusts the claims vector to c = b and then uses R to solve the problem (c , E). Thus, b is an upper bound for R (c, E). In my setting, reference points do not necessarily affect award vectors, although, because of RDPs, they do affect claimants' utility and thus aggregate welfare. Since the Talmud rule is a combination of the CEA and the CEL rules and the latter achieves minimal welfare (see the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix), its performance in terms of utilitarian welfare falls in the middle. In particular,
The following example illustrates all these results. 
By construction, the SCF rule selects an awards vector that matches the claims of as many claimants as possible and disappoints the remaining claimants as much as possible. 5 Proposition 2 describes how the rule performs in terms of utilitarian welfare.
PROPOSITION 2.
The SCF rule maximizes utilitarian welfare in any bankruptcy problem (c, E) ∈ B N in which claimants have RDPs and r = c.
The SCF rule thus dominates standard rules in terms of utilitarian welfare. 6 Since claimants display diminishing sensitivity to losses, the SCF rule achieves higher utilitarian welfare as it selects a more extreme allocation. This is evident if one compares the paths of awards that the various rules implement (see Figure 2 ). The path of awards is the locus of allocations that a rule selects as, holding fixed the claim vector c, the endowment E grows from 0 to C. Note that the order of the rules in the figure reflects their ranking in terms of utilitarian welfare.
Figure 2: Paths of awards with n = 2.
The awards vector SCF(c, E) may not be the sole allocation that maximizes welfare.
For instance, when there are only two claimants and max {c 1 , c 2 } ≤ E then there always exist two optimal allocations (see Figure 1 (a)). However, if multiple solutions exist, the SCF rule always selects a specific welfare-maximizing allocation.
PROPOSITION 3.
Whenever there exist multiple awards vectors that maximize utilitarian welfare the SCF rule selects the one that has the lowest level of inequality. 6 The dominance relation holds no matter if claimants are symmetric or asymmetric. The relation is always strict with the only exception being the case in which there exist n − 1 claimants with c i < E/n and one claimant j with c j > E − ∑ i =j c i , in which case SCF(c, E) = CEA(c, E) and thus W ut (SCF) = W ut (CEA).
The following example illustrates the result of Proposition 3. The following example illustrates the bite of the properties that I introduced in first identifying the rules that maximize utilitarian welfare and then characterize the SCF rule. In terms of more standard properties, the SCF rule satisfies Endowment Monotonicity, Scale Invariance, Path Independence, and Composition. It does not satisfy Claims Monotonicity and Order Preservation in Gains. 7 More importantly, it does not satisfy Equal Treatment of Equals. The property says that agents with identical claims should get identical awards. The analysis thus highlights a tension between the maximization of utilitarian welfare and the equity of the resulting awards vector. 8 As such, the SCF rule is possibly not palatable to an arbitrator who wants to be impartial and treat symmetric claimants in the same way. There are however situations in which an arbitrator should indeed discriminate across agents, even though their claims are symmetric. For instance, there may be differences among agents that are not captured by their claims but rather stem from individual characteristics (e.g., age, gender), exogenous rights, or merits (Moulin, 2000) . In these circumstances, the SCF rule may be appropriate to guide the choice of an arbitrator who wants to minimize the aggregate level of disappointment (i.e., the negative impact that perceived losses have on welfare).
Equal Treatment of Equals
The SCF rule actually satisfies a weaker form of Equal Treatment of Equals, which I label Ex-Ante Equal Treatment of Equals.
Ex-Ante Equal Treatment of Equals:
The SCF rule is thus procedurally fair (Bolton et al., 2005) . Ties among agents with the same claims are broken randomly in determining the priority order. Thus, the rule allocates the same expected award to identical claimants. 9 EXAMPLE 5. Consider the problem (c, E) with c = (30, 50, 50, 80) and E = 100. Let 1 ≺ c 2 ≺ c 3 ≺ c 4. Then, SCF(c, E) = (30, 50, 20, 0) such that claimants 2 and 3 are treated differently.
However, the orders ≺ c such that 1 ≺ c 2 ≺ c 3 ≺ c 4 and ≺ c such that 1 ≺ c 3 ≺ c 2 ≺ c 4 are ex-ante equally likely. Therefore, E(SCF 2 (c, E)) = E(SCF 3 (c, E)) = 35 so that claimants 2 and 3 are ex-ante treated equally.
MAXMIN WELFARE ANALYSIS
If the arbitrator adopts a maxmin welfare specification (see Eq. 3) the optimal allocation is the one that maximizes the utility of the worst-off individual. With no constraints on 8 The fact that the SCF rule does not satisfy Equal Treatment of Equals is evident when claimants are symmetric. In fact, if c i = c j for all i, j ∈ N then SCF(c, E) = c i , c i , ..., E − ∑ j≺ c i c j , 0, ..., 0 .
9 Analogously, one can also imagine a larger game in which the arbitrator chooses the specific order of priority to use by uniformly randomizing among all the orders that respect the condition i ≺ j iff c i < c j .
the awards vector, this allocation would then be the one that equalizes claimants' utility.
Boundedness may however make such an allocation unfeasible. I thus define the Minimal Utility Gap rule as the rule that makes claimants' utility as equal as possible.
DEFINITION 3.
The Minimal Utility Gap (MUG) rule assigns to each claimant the amount MUG i (c, E, u) such as to minimize the term
Proposition 6 then immediately follows. It is anyway possible to infer some general features of the solution MUG(c, E, u). Since claimants use their claims as reference points, their utility (see Eq. 1) is given by:
Utility depends positively on the amount of the endowment that the claimant receives, and negatively on his claim. The optimal allocation trades off these two effects across agents. With respect to the egalitarian allocation, the MUG rule thus assigns more of the endowment to agents who have higher claims. The size of these distortions increases with the relevance that perceived losses have on claimants' overall utility. If perceived losses have limited effects (i.e., the agent's well-being is mainly determined by the actual amount of the endowment that he receives from the arbitrator) then the CEA rule, by allocating the endowment across agents as equally as possible, will outperform other standard rules. 11 If instead perceived losses have a large effect on individual utilities, distortions become sizable and can modify the ranking between the CEA rule and the other rules. The following example illustrates these results. 11 With respect to the first-best solution (i.e., MUG(c, E)), the CEA rule allocates less (more) of the endowment to agents that have higher (lower) claims. 12 As usual, T(c, E) is bounded by CEA(c, E) and CEL(c, E). However, because of the shape of function W mm , in problem (b) the T rule achieves higher welfare than the CEA and the CEL rules. 
Zero Awards as Reference Point
Let agents have null reference points (r = 0). The setting is appropriate to describe all those situations in which agents do have claims on the endowment E but still consider them to be worthless, perhaps because they think that there is nothing to share (i.e., E = 
UTILITARIAN AND MAXMIN WELFARE ANALYSIS
Since agents are now perfectly symmetric (they all have the same reference point) and
RDPs postulate diminishing marginal sensitivity to gains, the rules that select the most egalitarian awards vectors achieve higher levels of welfare. Proposition 7 ranks the P, CEA, and CEL rules. The CEA rule not only dominates the other rules, it actually implements the first-best solution under both welfare specifications.
PROPOSITION 7.
The ranking W w (CEA) > W w (P) > W w (CEL) with w ∈ {ut, mm} holds in any bankruptcy problem (c, E) ∈ B N in which claimants have RDPs, r = 0, and c i = c j for some i, j ∈ N. In particular, the CEA rule achieves maximal (utilitarian and maxmin) welfare. 
and consider the bankruptcy problem (c, E) with c = (60, 90) and E = 100. 13 With respect to Examples 2 and 6, Example 7 only considers the problem (c, E) with c = (60, 90) and E = 100. The graphical analysis of the problem (c, E) with c = (60, 90) and E = 70 leads to similar results and it is therefore omitted. 
Minimal Rights as Reference Points
UTILITARIAN WELFARE ANALYSIS
It is always possible for the arbitrator to implement an allocation that matches (and possibly trespasses) the minimal rights of all the claimants. 14 Because of the properties of the µ(·) function (losses loom larger than gains), such an allocation will be welfare superior to any allocation in which R i (c, E) < m i for some i ∈ N. 14 To see this, assume first that all claimants have strictly positive minimal rights: m i > 0 for all i ∈ N. Then, ∑ i m i = nE − (n − 1)C such that E − ∑ i m i = (n − 1)(C − E) ≥ 0. Therefore, E ≥ ∑ i m i (which obviously also holds if m i = 0 for some i ∈ N) and an awards vector R(c, E) ≥ m is thus feasible. 15 Although the functional form of the CEG rule is rather complex, its intuition is clear. In terms of standard properties, the CEG rule satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals, Endowment Monotonicity, Claims Monotonicity, Order Preservation in Gains, Scale Invariance, and Path Independence. It fails Composition. I do not provide a characterization of the rule as it would be too ad hoc.
MAXMIN WELFARE ANALYSIS
If the arbitrator follows maxmin welfare, the Minimal Utility Gap (MUG) rule (see Definition 3) is the optimal rule.
that awards vector must satisfy Boundedness. Thus, if CEG * i (c, E) > c i for some i ∈ N, the amount CEG * i (c, E) − c i > 0 must be redistributed among the other claimants in a welfare-maximizing way. 16 The fact that T(c, E) = CEG(c, E) in both problems is a peculiarity of the two claimants case and does not hold in general. For instance, if c = (10, 40, 70) and E = 100 then T(c, E) = (5, 32.5, 62.5) and CEG(c, E) = (10, 30, 60) with W ut (CEG) > W ut (T). With respect to the egalitarian allocation, the MUG rule allocates more of the endowment to claimants who have higher minimal rights. The intuition is that these agents will experience lower perceived gains and must thus be compensated with a relatively higher allocation of the endowment. As it was the case in Section 3.1, if the relevance of perceived gains is limited then the awards vector MUG(c, E, u) will be close to the egalitarian allocation. Thus, the CEA rule will outperform other standard rules. Different rankings can instead emerge when the impact of perceived gains on claimants' total utility is sizable. 17 
Expected Awards as Reference Points
As a last specification, I let claimants' reference points be determined by their expectations about what the arbitrator will do. Say that claimants hold (common) beliefs about final outcomes, i.e., about the awards vector (analogously, the rule) that the arbitrator will select. These beliefs are described by the probability distribution F defined over the set of vectors V = {P(c, E), CEA(c, E), CEL(c, E), T(c, E)} and with density f . 17 I avoid replicating the illustrative example and the figures as the situation is similar to the one described in Section 3.1 for the case r = c (see Example 6 and Figure 3) . 
where v ∈ V and u(R i (c, E) | v i ) is as defined in (1). The formulation thus considers how R i (c, E) compares with all the possible alternatives in V. 18 I first consider the case of F being a degenerate probability distribution, so that f (v) = 1 for some v ∈ V. Claimants thus expect the arbitrator to implement a specific awards vector, perhaps because the latter publicly announced the rule that he intends to use or built a reputation for always using a certain rule. I then let F be a non-degenerate distribution, so that claimants are indeed uncertain about what the arbitrator will do. 19 18 A claimant's expected utility instead evaluates all possible outcomes in light of all possible reference points (see again Kőszegi and Rabin, 2007) . Since both random variables are distributed according to F, expected utility is given by:
UTILITARIAN WELFARE ANALYSIS
If agents expect the arbitrator to implement the award vector R(c, E), then it is indeed
However, as aggregate welfare is determined by the actual utility that claimants experience, the arbitrator uses agents' ex-post evaluations (as defined in (4)) as inputs of the social welfare functions. 19 Claimants thus face uncertainty about the arbitrator's type. Habis and Herings (2013) study bankruptcy problems that are instead stochastic in the value of the endowment and in the value of agents' claims. Habis and Herings (2013) associate to any stochastic bankruptcy problem a state-dependent transferable utility game and then test the stability of standard rules to uncertainty. Interestingly, they also find that the CEA rule is "superior" to other rules, as in their setting the CEA rule emerges as the only stable rule.
The statement of Proposition 10 conveys two interesting implications. First, it is welfare improving for the arbitrator to communicate (or build a reputation for) which rule he will adopt. Second, once that the arbitrator announces his policy R he should not deviate from it. In particular, he should resist the lobbying that may come from those claimants who would be better off under an alternative rule R = R. What these individuals would gain under rule R gets more than compensated by the perceived losses that other claimants would suffer.
If the distribution F is non-degenerate results are less clear-cut. By continuity, generic rule R ∈ {P, CEA, CEL, T} remains the optimal rule when claimants are reasonably confident that the arbitrator will use it (i.e., f (R(c, E)) = 1 is high enough). When instead agents' beliefs are more diffuse, the rule that maximizes welfare varies depending on the parameters of the problem. To see this, note that rules R and R generate utilitarian welfare:
where v ∈ V and µ(·) = 0 for v = R i (c, E) and v = R i (c, E) respectively. Because of the properties of the gain-loss function the last term in both equations is strictly negative.
However, a univocal ranking of W ut (R) and W ut (R ) does not exist as it is affected by the specific numerical values of the awards vectors in V (and thus by agents' original claims)
and by the distribution of beliefs.
MAXMIN WELFARE ANALYSIS
Contrary to the previous section, when F is such that f (R(c, E)) = 1 for some R(c, E) ∈ V, a deviation by the arbitrator from the announced policy R may increase welfare when this takes the maxmin specification and the deviation improves the well-being of the worst-off
individual. As such, rule R does not necessarily maximize welfare when claimants expect the arbitrator to use it.
Standard rules however satisfy Order Preservation in Gains. The order of awards thus reflects the order of claims such that the worst-off individual is the agent with the lowest claim. By construction, the CEA rule is the most generous one towards the claimant with the lowest claim as it allocates him the award CEA i (c, E) = min{c i , E/n}. Then, if agents expect the arbitrator to implement the CEA allocation, the CEA rule indeed maximizes welfare. Any deviation to a different rule decreases the utility of the worst-off individual:
not only the alternative rule assigns to the agent less of the endowment, it also inflicts him a loss as the actual amount that the agent gets falls short of his expectations.
PROPOSITION 11.
The CEA rule maximizes maxmin welfare in any bankruptcy problem (c, E) ∈ B N in which claimants have RDPs, r = F, and f (CEA(c, E)) = 1.
The result of Proposition 11 partly extends to the setting in which F is non-degenerate.
As said, the CEA rule is the rule that allocates the largest amount to the agent who gets the least. Moreover, the actual realization of CEA(c, E) generates some additional pleasant feelings of perceived gains as the agent compares CEA i (c, E) with all other (less favorable) awards he could have got. And the more unlikely the outcome CEA(c, E) was, the larger are these positive effects. As such, the CEA rule maximizes welfare for a wide range of parameters. It may however happen that the perceived losses that claimant j = i experiences because of the realization of the vector CEA(c, E) makes j become the worstoff individual. In these circumstances, it is no more necessarily the case that the CEA rule is the optimal rule.
Extensions
In this section I discuss some additional topics of interest and extensions of the baseline model.
Duality
How do standard duality results get affected when claimants have RDPs? To answer this question I define as a Bankruptcy Problem with Reference Points a triplet (c, E, r). With respect to the notation (c, E) that I used so far, the new notation highlights the role that agents' reference points may play in determining the awards vectors that different rules select. 20 I can then immediately define the notions of dual problems and dual rules. The analysis however showed that reference points influence the awards vectors that some other rules select. When this is the case, Definition 5 leads to novel duality results. Similarly to the SCF rule, the LCF rule fails Equal Treatment of Equals but satisfies its weaker version, Ex-Ante Equal Treatment of Equals. Notice however that duality has no implications on how a rule performs in terms of welfare. The SCF rule maximizes utilitarian welfare when r = c (see Proposition 2) . Still, it is not true that the LCF rule achieves minimal welfare. 22 
No Boundedness
The In line with this view, I so far discussed the issue of welfare maximization only within the set of allocations that satisfy these properties. However, while it is obvious that with monotonically increasing preferences Balance is a necessary condition for welfare maximization, my analysis suggests that Boundedness may sometimes act as a constraint toward this goal. The (utilitarian or maxmin) social welfare function may in fact achieve a global maximum outside of the domain defined by this condition. Example 11 illustrates the situation. 23 22 For instance, LCF(c, E, r) = (10, 90) in Figure 1 (a), whereas LCF(c, E, r) = (0, 70) in Figure 1(b) . 23 In the example claimants use their claims as reference points and the arbitrator cares about utilitarian welfare. In particular, problem (a) in Example 11 is analogous to problem (a) in Example 2. Similar examples can be constructed for maxmin welfare and for other specifications of claimants' reference points. EXAMPLE 11. Let claimant i ∈ {1, 2} have utility function it would be hard for the arbitrator to actually implement them as some agents would perceive these solutions as extremely unfair. The compliance to allocate to each claimant (at least) his minimal rights thus provides a welfare rationale for Boundedness.
Heterogeneous Gain-Loss Functions
The utility function defined in Section 2.2 postulates that agents have a symmetric gainloss function: µ i (·) = µ(·) for any i ∈ N. Here I study the implications of assuming heterogeneous gain-loss functions. I thus adopt the following utility specification:
where µ i (·) is now idiosyncratic to agent i ∈ N but still obeys the general properties defined in Section 2.2.
How different rules perform in terms of aggregate welfare continues to be driven by agents' diminishing sensitivity to gains and losses. However, the strength of these effects 
EXAMPLE 12.
Let claimant i ∈ {1, 2} have utility function More in general, albeit the assumption of heterogeneous gain-loss functions seems certainly appropriate in many contexts, it makes the goal of welfare maximization more demanding from an informational point of view. In fact, not only the arbitrator should know claimants' reference points, he should also know their idiosyncratic gain-loss functions. As such, the analysis that postulates a symmetric µ(·) function can be justified through a "behind the veil of ignorance" argument or interpreted as a viable heuristics that an arbitrator may use.
Conclusions
I studied bankruptcy problems when claimants have reference-dependent preferences.
The setting is natural and leads to important welfare implications that I explored under different specifications of claimants' reference points and different measures of welfare. 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Let (c, E) ∈ B N and r = c. Generic rule R selects the awards vector R(c, E) and generates utilitarian welfare W ut (R) = E + ∑ i∈N µ(−l i (R)), where l i (R) = c i − R i (c, E) ≥ 0 is claimant i's loss. Aggregate loss is L = ∑ i∈N l i (R) = C − E and mean loss isl(R) = L n for any R. Therefore, rules only differ in how they allocate individual losses, holding fixed aggregate loss and mean loss. Let R and R be two rules, l(R) and l (R ) be the vectors of individual losses, and σ 2 (l(R)) and σ 2 (l (R )) be the variance of the elements of l(R) and l (R ). Without loss of generality, let
Because of the strict convexity of the µ(·) function in the domain of losses, it follows that ∑ i∈N µ (−l i (R )) < ∑ i∈N µ (−l i (R)) < 0 and thus W ut (R) > W ut (R ). It is thus sufficient to show that σ 2 (l(R)) > σ 2 (l (R )) to prove that W ut (R) > W ut (R ). Consider now the P, CEA, and CEL rules. By construction, the CEL rule allocates L as equally as possible. Given that CEL(c, E) = R(c, E) for R ∈ {P, CEA} whenever c i = c j for some i, j ∈ N, it follows that l(CEL) = l(R). It then must be the case that σ 2 (l(R)) > σ 2 (l(CEL)) for any R ∈ {P, CEA}. Therefore, min {W ut (P), W ut (CEA)} > W ut (CEL). Now compare the CEA and the P rules. Assume first that the condition c i ≥ E n for all i holds. Then, CEA(c, E) = E n , ..., E n . Therefore, l(CEA) is such that l i (CEA)) = c i − E n for all i. As such, σ 2 (l(CEA)) = σ 2 (c). Instead, P(c, E) = λc with λ = E C such that λ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, l i (P) = (1 − λ) c i for all i. It follows that σ 2 (l(P)) = (1 − λ) 2 σ 2 (c) and thus σ 2 (l(CEA)) > σ 2 (l(P)). If instead c i < E n for some i, then l(CEA) is such that l i (CEA) = 0 for some i, whereas l(P) is such that l i (P) > 0 for all i. The relation σ 2 (l(CEA)) > σ 2 (l(P)) thus still holds. Therefore, W ut (CEA) > W ut (P). Since we already showed that min {W ut (P), W ut (CEA)} > W ut (CEL), we can conclude that W ut (CEA) > W ut (P) > W ut (CEL).
Proof of Proposition 2
Let (c, E) ∈ B N and r = c. Now consider the problem max l W ut = E + ∑ i∈N µ(−l i ) where
.., l n ), and µ(−l i ) ≤ 0 for any i ∈ N. If C = E then l = (0, ..., 0) and the SCF rule (as any other rule) trivially maximizes welfare. If instead C > E then l is such that l i > 0 (and thus µ(−l i ) < 0) for ξ(l) ∈ {1, ..., n} claimants. Let R and R be two rules and denote with l(R) and l (R ) the vectors of individual losses. Given that ∑ i∈N l i (R) = ∑ i∈N l i (R ) = L, the diminishing marginal sensitivity to losses of µ(·) implies that if ξ(l(R)) < ξ (l (R )) then W ut (R) > W ut (R ). By construction the SCF rule minimizes ξ(l(R)) and thus maximizes utilitarian welfare.
since all other terms cancel out. This simplifies to
which is always true given that L − ∑ n j=k+1 l j ≥ 0 and c k ≥ cˆk.
Proof of Proposition 4
I first show that if a rule R maximizes utilitarian welfare then the awards vector R(c, E) satisfies Large Losers and Unique Residual Loser. By the proof of Proposition 3, we know that the rules that maximize utilitarian welfare are those that select an awards vector
where claimant k ∈ {1, ..., n} is such that ∑ k−1 j=1 c j < E ≤ ∑ k j=1 c j , andk ∈ {1, ..., k} is such that cˆk − L − ∑ n j=k+1 l j ≥ 0. I now show thatL i < c i for all i ∈ {1, .., k}, whereasL i ≥ c i for all i ∈ {k + 1, .., n}, whereL i is claimant i's Cumulative Aggregate Loss (see Definition 2 in the main text).
Since the conditionL i < c i holds for claimant k, it also holds for all i ∈ {1, .., k − 1}. Consider now
Since the conditioñ L i ≥ c i holds for claimant k + 1, it also holds for all i ∈ {k + 2, .., n}. The awards vectorR(c, E) thus satisfies Large Losers, since it assignsR i (c, E) = 0 to each claimant i ∈ {k + 1, ..., n} and these are the agents for which the conditionL i ≥ c i holds. The vectorR(c, E) also satisfies Unique Residual Loser since claimant k ∈ {1, ..., n} is the agent for which 0 <L k < c k and claimantk ∈ {1, ..., k} is the agent that fulfills the condition Rˆk (c, E) = cˆk −L k ≥ 0. I now prove that if an awards vector R(c, E) satisfies Large Losers and Unique Residual Loser then rule R maximizes utilitarian welfare. Consider the generic awards vector: R(c, E) = (R 1 (c, E) , ..., R n (c, E)) with R i (c, E) ∈ [0, c i ] for any i ∈ N. Large Losers implies: R(c, E) = (R 1 (c, E), R 2 (c, E) , ..., R k (c, E), 0, ..., 0) since claimants j ∈ {k + 1, ..., n} are those for which the conditionL j ≥ c j holds. Unique Residual Loser then implies that there exists a claimantk ∈ {1, ..., k} such that: R(c, E) = R 1 (c, E), ..., cˆk −L k , Rˆk +1 (c, E) , ..., R k (c, E), 0, ..., 0 . 
Proof of Proposition 5
It is immediate to verify that the SCF rule satisfies Large Losers and Unique Residual Loser Is The Last. I now prove that the converse also holds true. As in the proof of Proposition 4, Large Losers implies: R(c, E) = (R 1 (c, E), R 2 (c, E), ..., R k (c, E), 0, ..., 0) where k ∈ {1, ..., n} is such that 0 <L k < c k . Unique Residual Loser Is The Last then implies: R(c, E) = R 1 (c, E), R 2 (c, E), ..., c k −L k , 0, ..., 0 . 
Proof of Proposition 6
The utility function of any claimant i ∈ N is continuous and strictly increasing in R i (c, E) and the awards vector satisfies Balance. Then, if feasible, maxmin welfare gets maximized by the vector R(c, E) such that min{u(R i (c, E) | r i = c i )} i∈N = max{u(R i (c, E) | r i = c i )} i∈N . If instead Boundedness makes such a vector unfeasible then maxmin welfare gets maximized by any vector R(c, E) with R j (c, E) = c j where agent j ∈ N is the agent for which u(c j | r j = c j ) = c j = min{u(R i (c, E) | r i = c i )} i∈N . By construction, the MUG rule selects these award vectors in both cases and thus it always maximizes welfare.
Proof of Proposition 7
Let (c, E) ∈ B N and r = 0. Generic rule R generates utilitarian welfare W ut (R) = E + ∑ i∈N µ(g i (R)), where g i (R) = R i (c, E) − 0 = R i (c, E) is claimant i's perceived gain. It follows that g i (R) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and ∑ i∈N g i (R) = E. Because of the strict concavity of µ(·) in the domain of gains, the lower is the variance of g(R) = (R 1 (c, E) , ..., R n (c, E)), the higher is the welfare that R generates. Since the CEA rule allocates E as equally as possible, the awards vector CEA(c, E) maximizes welfare and thus W ut (CEA) > max {W ut (P), W ut (CEL)} whenever c i = c j for some i, j ∈ N. Now compare the P and the CEL rules. Assume first that c i ≥ L n for all i ∈ N. Then, g i (P) = λc i (with λ ∈ (0, 1)) and g i (CEL) = c i − L n for all i. Thus, σ 2 (g(P)) < σ 2 (g(CEL)) since σ 2 (g(P)) = λ 2 σ 2 (c) whereas σ 2 (g(CEL)) = σ 2 (c). If instead c i < L n for some i ∈ N, then g i (CEL) = 0 for some i ∈ N whereas g i (P) > 0 for all i ∈ N such that the relation σ 2 (g(P)) < σ 2 (g(CEL)) still holds. Therefore, W ut (CEA) > W ut (P) > W ut (CEL).
Proof of Proposition 8
Let (c, E) ∈ B N and r = m. Then W ut (R) = E + ∑ i µ(g i (R)) where g i (R) = R i (c, E) − m i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N. The strict concavity of µ(·) in the domain of gains implies that the lower is the variance of g(R), the higher is W ut (R). and claimant j ∈ {1, ..., n} is the first agent for which the condition m j + ξ ≤ c j holds. Therefore, the vector of perceived gains is g(CEG) = c 1 − m 1 , ..., c j−1 − m j−1 , ξ, ...ξ .
such that g i (CEG) < ξ for all i ∈ {1, ..., j − 1} and the last n − j + 1 terms are equal. Boundedness implies that there are no awards vector R(c, E) such that g i (R) > g i (CEG) for some i ∈ {1, ..., j − 1}. Balance implies that if an awards vector R(c, E) is such that g i (R) < ξ for some i ∈ {j, ..., n} then it must be the case that g k (R) > ξ for some k ∈ {j, ..., n} with k = i. Therefore, σ 2 (g(CEG)) < σ 2 (g(R)) for any R = CEG so that the CEG rule maximizes utilitarian welfare.
Proof of Proposition 9
The proof replicates the proof of Proposition 6 with the condition r i = m i instead of r i = c i .
Proof of Proposition 10
Let (c, E) ∈ B N . Let r = F and F be such that f (R(c, E)) = 1. Then, W ut (R) = E since r i = R i (c, E) and thus µ(R i (c, E) − r i ) = µ(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N. Now consider any rule R = R. Since both R(c, E) and R (c, E) satisfy Balance, it must be the case that R i (c, E) > R i (c, E) for some i ∈ N and R j (c, E) < R j (c, E) for some j ∈ N with j = i. However, the fact that |µ(−z)| > µ(z) for any z > 0 (losses loom larger than gains) implies that ∑ i∈N µ R i (c, E) − R i (c, E) < 0 and thus W ut (R ) < E. Therefore, W ut (R) > W ut (R ) for any R = R.
Proof of Proposition 11
Let (c, E) ∈ B N . Let r = F and F be such that f (CEA(c, E)) = 1. Define agent 1 as an agent for which c 1 ≤ c i for any i ∈ N. Then, W mm (CEA) = CEA 1 (c, E) since, for any i ∈ N, u(CEA i (C, E) | (CEA i (c, E)) = CEA i (C, E) and CEA 1 (c, E) ≤ CEA i (c, E) because the CEA rule satisfies the property of Order Preservation in Gains. Any rule R = CEA leads instead to W mm (R) = R 1 (c, E) + µ(R 1 (c, E) − CEA 1 (c, E)). Given that R 1 (c, E) ≤ CEA 1 (c, E) and µ(R 1 (c, E) − (CEA(c, E)) ≤ 0, it follows that W mm (CEA) ≥ W mm (R) for any R = CEA.
